

Department of the Interior Departmental Manual

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Chapter 5: Aircraft and Aviation Facility Security

Originating Office: National Business Center

352 DM 5

5.1 **Purpose.** This chapter sets forth policies and procedures designed to safeguard Department of the Interior (DOI) owned or controlled aircraft against theft and associated misuse by terrorists or individuals engaging in other criminal activity.

5.2 **Objective.** The policies and procedures in this chapter are intended to make the theft of Departmental aircraft more difficult and time consuming and, therefore, an unattractive target to potential criminals or terrorists.

5.3 **Scope and Applicability.**

A. To the extent applicable, the policies and procedures established herein are intended to supplement the minimum physical security standards detailed in 444 DM 1, Appendix A. Nothing in this chapter reduces the requirements prescribed by 444 DM 1, “*Physical Protection and Building Security*,” or any other requirement established by law or authority as it pertains to DOI aviation operations.

B. The policies and procedures established herein are applicable to all aviation facilities and aircraft owned or controlled by the DOI.

C. Contractors are solely responsible for the security of their aircraft while under the control of the DOI. All DOI aviation contracts will include language detailing the DOI aviation security policies applicable to contractor operations and require contractor compliance with those policies.

5.4 **Definitions.** For the purpose of this chapter, the following definitions apply:

A. The term “aircraft operations area” (AOA) means the area within an aviation facility in which flight-capable aircraft are present for any purpose, including but not limited to the loading or unloading of cargo or passengers, refueling, maintenance, parking, and storage.

B. The term “aviation facility” means any DOI owned or controlled real property used for aircraft landing and takeoff at which DOI owned or controlled aircraft are permanently based.

C. The term “Bureau Aviation Manager” refers to that individual delegated by the agency or office head to be responsible for the management of all aspects of a bureau or office aviation program.

D. The term “control” is used in two contexts.

(1) As it relates to aviation facilities, the term “control” refers to the condition existing when a DOI entity has authority to institute, modify, or otherwise effect physical security changes at an aviation facility regardless of property ownership.

(2) As it relates to aircraft, the term “control” means “operational control” as defined in the Federal Aviation Regulations at 41 CFR 1.1: “Operational control with respect to a flight means the exercise of authority over initiating, conducting, or terminating a flight.” This definition is independent of aircraft ownership.

E. The term “dual-lock method” means using a combination of two locking devices or methods to physically secure or disable a parked aircraft for the purpose of reducing the probability of aircraft theft and associated misuse by unauthorized persons.

F. The term “risk assessment” refers to the result of a combined threat and vulnerability assessment. It can generally be characterized as an analysis of the probability of serious impact or damage resulting from a known or postulated threat successfully exploiting one or more vulnerabilities.

5.5 Risk Assessment. To assess the risk of theft and associated misuse of DOI owned or controlled aircraft by terrorists or individuals engaging in other criminal activity, the Bureau Aviation Manager will ensure a risk assessment is conducted for each aviation facility. Risk assessments will conform to the following conditions:

A. Individuals conducting aviation facility risk assessments will utilize the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) “*Airport Characteristics Measurement Tool*” (ACMT) as one method of determining where DOI aviation facilities fall within the risk spectrum. Guidance on the use of the ACMT can be found in TSA Information Publication A-001, *Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports* which is available on the TSA Web site at www.tsa.gov. The character of any risk assessment tools used to supplement the ACMT is left to the discretion of the Bureau Aviation Manager.

B. Individuals responsible for conducting aviation facility risk assessments should be intimately familiar with the facility, its activities, and the surrounding areas.

C. The DOI Office of Law Enforcement and Security (OLEs) will review all aviation facility risk assessments to determine adequacy.

D. Each aviation facility risk assessment will be periodically reexamined and adjusted as necessary to ensure it accurately reflects current conditions. The Bureau Aviation Manager will ensure such reexamination occurs a minimum of every 2 years.

5.6 Security Plan. To ensure all aviation facility personnel and authorized users follow uniform facility security practices and incident response procedures, the Bureau Aviation Manager will ensure a written security plan is prepared for each aviation facility. Security plans will conform to the following conditions:

A. Individuals preparing aviation facility security plans will follow the TSA “Security Procedures Template.” The template can be found in Appendix G of TSA Information Publication A-001, *Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports*, which is available on the TSA Web site at www.tsa.gov.

B. The scope and depth of the aviation facility security plan should be commensurate with the size and operating complexity of the facility for which it is prepared.

C. The OLES will review all aviation facility security plans for sufficiency.

D. Each aviation facility security plan will be regularly reviewed and adjusted as necessary for currency. The Bureau Aviation Manager will ensure such review occurs a minimum of every 2 years.

5.7 Training. The heads of bureaus are responsible for ensuring that all employees involved in the control or use of aviation resources receive an appropriate level of aviation security training. Responsibilities for development, implementation, and maintenance of aviation training curriculums are found in the National Business Center Aviation Management Directorate (NBC AMD) Operational Procedures Memorandum “*Aviation User Training Program*.” This Memorandum is available on the NBC AMD Web site at www.nbc.gov/amd.

5.8 Compliance Evaluations.

A. Aviation security is considered a key element of each bureau aviation program. Compliance with the aircraft and aviation facility security policy will be assessed through the aviation safety program evaluation process outlined in Departmental Manual 352 DM 2, “*Aviation Program Evaluation*.” This document is available on the NBC AMD Web page at <http://www.nbc.gov/amd>.

B. The OLES will be afforded an opportunity to participate in aviation program evaluations and preparation of findings and recommendations. At its discretion, the OLES, in consultation with the Aviation Management Directorate Associate Director may conduct independent evaluations of aircraft and aviation facility security policy compliance at any time.

5.9 Aviation Facility Security Requirements.

A. Security levels and minimum security requirements for Federal facilities are detailed within 444 DM 1, “*Physical Protection and Building Security.*” DOI aviation facilities must comply with this Part.

B. To further guarantee that appropriate measures are in place to secure aircraft against theft and associated misuse, the Bureau Aviation Manager will ensure the TSA ACMT point scoring system is utilized to identify the TSA “*Suggested Airport Security Enhancements*” for each DOI aviation facility. Implementation guidance for the TSA Suggested Airport Security Enhancements can be found in appendix C of TSA Information Publication A-001, *Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports*, which is available on the TSA Web site at www.tsa.gov.

(1) For the purposes of this policy, the TSA Suggested Airport Security Enhancements identified for each DOI facility through the TSA ACMT point scoring system will be considered minimum mandatory security requirements.

(2) Where necessary, the OLES has clarified and/or supplemented the TSA “*Suggested Airport Security Enhancements.*” These supplemental requirements will be considered components of the minimum mandatory TSA Suggested Airport Security Enhancements identified for each DOI facility through the TSA ACMT point scoring system. This supplemental Departmental guidance can be found in Appendix 1.

(3) The Bureau Aviation Manager may elect to increase a facility’s identified minimum mandatory security requirements based upon knowledge of risk factors not considered by the ACMT and/or the findings of a supplemental risk assessment.

C. Exceptions.

(1) If facility ownership or control constraints preclude full implementation of the identified minimum mandatory security requirements, the Bureau Aviation Manager will immediately notify the Director, OLES, in writing.

(a) This written notification will detail the minimum mandatory security requirement(s) which cannot be implemented and the circumstances preventing implementation. A waiver of the requirement(s) may be requested. The OLES will review the submission and advise the Bureau Aviation Manager accordingly.

(b) Pending the OLES response, the facility will comply with 352 DM 5.10, “Aircraft Physical Security Requirements.”

(2) If funding restrictions preclude timely implementation of the identified minimum mandatory security requirement(s), the Bureau Aviation Manager will immediately notify the Director, OLES, in writing.

(a) This written notification will detail the minimum mandatory security requirement(s) which cannot presently be implemented and provide an estimate of when

the requirement(s) will be in place. A waiver of the requirement(s) may be requested. The OLES will review the submission and advise the Bureau Aviation Manager accordingly.

(b) Pending the OLES response, the facility will comply with 352 DM.

5.10 Aircraft Physical Security Requirements.

A. At any time DOI owned or controlled aircraft are not directly attended by Department-authorized flight or ground personnel, the aircraft will be physically secured and disabled via the dual-lock method. Examples of acceptable dual-lock devices and their conditions of use are listed in Appendix 2.

B. Exceptions. The requirements of 352 DM 5.10 do not apply to:

(1) Military or government agency cooperator aircraft under DOI operational control. Such cooperator aircraft shall adhere to their department-specific aircraft security policies.

(2) Aircraft mechanically incapable of flight.

Aviation Facility Security – Supplemental Requirements

The following supplemental requirements are intended to clarify and/or broaden specific “*Suggested Airport Security Enhancements*” presented within TSA Information Publication A-001, *Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports* (www.tsa.gov).

When use of these suggested airport security enhancements is indicated, the supplemental requirements listed herein will be considered mandatory and in addition to those prescribed by the TSA *Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports*.

Signage

- Signage should be multi-lingual where appropriate.

Lighting

- Lighting type and illumination levels will comply with published Illuminating Engineering Society (IES) standards but will not supersede standard aviation guidelines governing runway lighting and nighttime flight requirements.

Fencing

- Install perimeter security fencing as needed to control access to the AOA and all other sensitive areas.
- Fence height and other characteristics will comply with standard FAA guidelines where appropriate. Where FAA guidelines are not available, minimum fencing characteristics will be sufficient to meet access control needs.

Access Control

All access to the AOA and other sensitive areas will be subject to access control procedures.

- General
 - All access points leading from uncontrolled areas into the AOA or other sensitive areas will be positively controlled to prevent unauthorized entry. Positive control methods include but are not limited to:
 - Keyed access points and guard-regulated access points.
 - Anti-passback, anti-piggyback, and anti-tailgating systems or protocols should be implemented where appropriate.

- A “key control” system will be used to regulate and monitor the distribution of all access devices including but not limited to keys, access cards, passes, badges, combinations, and codes. Control procedures will include:
 - The number of access devices available will be limited and will require approval to duplicate and/or disseminate.
 - All excess access devices must be kept in a secure location.
 - All combinations and codes will be changed regularly.
 - A record will be kept identifying the access devices distributed to specific individuals.
 - If access devices are lost or compromised, access point key controls must be “rekeyed.”
- Pedestrian and Vehicular
 - Visitors/vendors/passengers and Departmental/facility personnel.

Dual-Lock Method – Locking Devices and Methods

The dual-lock method consists of any combination of anti-theft devices on or within the aircraft, devices designed to lock aircraft flight control surfaces when not in use, or lockable devices designed to secure an aircraft to the ground.

The following are examples of locking devices and methods which can be used in tandem to achieve the required dual-lock condition. Utilization of other means of securing or disabling an aircraft are acceptable provided they achieve a level of security equal to or greater than the methods listed herein.

Examples of Acceptable Dual-Lock Devices and Methods

- Locking hangar door
- Keyed magneto
- Keyed starter switch
- Keyed master power switch
- Hidden battery cutoff switches
- Throttle lock
- Mixture lock
- Locking fuel cutoff
- Locking control surface “gust-lock”
- Propeller lock
- Propeller chain
- Propeller cable
- Locking wheel lock or chock
- Locking tiedown cable
- “Club-type” devices for control yoke

Where aircraft type (e.g., airtanker) or operational area conditions (e.g., requirement for ground personnel to reposition parked aircraft) preclude the effective use of external locking security devices, vehicles or other objects may be positioned so as to block or impede aircraft movement. When this method is utilized, a secondary locking device is still required

Examples of Unacceptable Dual-Lock Devices and Methods

- Locking aircraft doors
- Fenced or gated tiedown area

Advisements

- Operational environments and personnel safety must be considered when selecting the locking devices and methods to be used.
- Locking devices and methods must be appropriate for their aircraft.
- Removal and/or disabling of locking devices and methods must be incorporated into preflight checklists to prevent accidental damage to aircraft.
- Locking devices and methods must be installed in a manner which precludes their inadvertent interference with in-flight operations.